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Nietzsche on Loneliness, Self-Transformation, 
and the Eternal Recurrence
JuSTiN REMHOF |  OLD DOMiNiON uNiVERSiTY
Abstract: Nietzsche’s presentation of the eternal recurrence in Gay Science 341 is 
often viewed as a practical thought experiment meant to radically transform us. 
But exactly why and how we are supposed to be transformed is not clear. I con-
tend that addressing these issues requires taking a close look at the psycholog-
ical setting of the passage. The eternal recurrence is presented in our “loneliest 
loneliness.” I argue that facing the eternal recurrence from a state of profound 
loneliness both motivates self-transformation and contributes toward helping 
us succeed at that project.
Keywords: loneliness, eternal recurrence, self-transformation, morality, empiri-
cal psychology 
What Cara would forget is that talking to her sister, Cara didn’t feel 
any of those things. That for a time she only felt lonely: a loneliness 
so physical it was part of her, a second tongue that shaped her 
every word, a muscle so strong and necessary she was certain it had 
always been there.
—Kevin Clouther, “Puritan Hotel, Boston”
Nietzsche’s presentation of the eternal recurrence in GS 341 is often viewed 
as a practical thought experiment aimed at testing the worth of a life, rather 
than a metaphysical view about the way the world is.1 The experiment con-
cerns a “demon” who tells us “this life as you now live it and have lived it 
you will have to live once again and innumerable times again” (GS 341).2 
This thought is supposed to radically transform us. Nietzsche states, “If this 
thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly 
crush you” (GS 341).3 And, at the end of the passage, he asks, “how well 
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disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for noth-
ing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” 
(GS 341). But exactly why and how we are supposed to be transformed is 
not clear. I contend that addressing these issues requires taking a close look 
at something that has received very little attention in the literature: the fact 
that the demon presents the eternal recurrence in our “loneliest loneliness 
[einsamste Einsamkeit].”4 In this article, I aim to explain why and how 
Nietzsche thinks facing the eternal recurrence in a psychological state of 
our deepest loneliness is supposed to be transformative.
Here is the plan. I begin by explaining why “Einsamkeit” should be trans-
lated as “loneliness” and offering a basic definition of loneliness. Afterward 
I describe the reaction that Nietzsche anticipates our having when we imag-
ine the eternal recurrence in a state of severe loneliness: out of horror, we 
want to reject the demon’s suggestion. But loneliness, I argue, motivates 
its own overcoming, like hunger or thirst. I then point to contemporary 
empirical psychological research to suggest that loneliness both motivates 
Nietzschean self-transformation and supplies crucial conditions that help 
enable success. Such success empowers us to affirm the eternal recurrence. 
I finish by responding to objections, explaining an important virtue of my 
account, and showing that other interpretations of the psychological setting 
of the test fail to secure the motivation to undergo and achieve Nietzschean 
self-transformation.
Let us begin. My reading of the eternal recurrence in GS 341 turns on 
translating “Einsamkeit” as “loneliness.” But “Einsamkeit” could also be 
rendered as “solitude,” in which case “einsamste Einsamkeit” would be 
“most solitary solitude.”5 How should we pick a translation? We should 
 prefer whatever best fits Nietzsche’s aims. “Loneliness” best satisfies the 
aim of GS 341, which is to provoke self-transformation. Nietzsche regards 
solitude as a virtue that indicates confident self-reliance. Those who are 
“higher” and “greater,” he says, including “free spirits” and “philosophers of 
the future,” are “friends of solitude” (BGE 44; see also EH P 3). Loneliness 
indicates something else entirely. Nietzsche connects loneliness with 
“shades of distress,” “weariness,” and “gloominess” (BGE 26; see also Z III: 
“The Wanderer”). Loneliness involves vulnerability. We are vulnerable 
when lonely because we feel that something about our lives is missing or 
unfulfilled. Specifically, we are precluded from making certain connections 
that we long to establish, connections that concern who we take ourselves 
to be.6 Such feelings can push us to transform our lives. Indeed, Nietzsche 
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tends to believe that the best forms of change come from suffering.7 
Confident self-reliance seems to have no such motivational force. When 
translating “Einsamkeit” in GS 341, then, we have reason to prefer “loneli-
ness” over “solitude,” and this translation choice will gain further support 
as we continue.8
What does “loneliness” mean? Ordinarily, it signifies the pain of feeling 
alone. Depending on the individual and circumstance, of course, loneli-
ness can mean much more. For instance, it can indicate a painful sense of 
longing or loss of support. Loneliness could point to something fleeting, 
maybe even momentarily welcomed, or it could signify an enduring sense 
of desolation, perhaps even inconsolable loss. Despite such nuances, under-
standing loneliness merely as the pain of feeling alone will suffice for the 
argument I develop below.9 Importantly, by linking loneliness with “shades 
of distress,” “weariness,” and “gloominess” (BGE 26), Nietzsche seems to 
accept the commonsense definition. For instance, in the 1886 preface to 
HH he writes, “Loneliness [Einsamkeit] encircles and embraces him [the 
free spirit], ever more threatening, suffocating, heart-tightening, that ter-
rible goddess and mater saeva cupidinum” (HH P 3).10 The free spirit is 
struck with feeling alone, which is characterized as “threatening,” “suffo-
cating,” and “heart-tightening.” All of these refer to states of pain. Indeed, 
when Zarathustra approaches his “ultimate loneliness,” he cries that he 
must descend “deeper into pain than I ever descended, down to its blackest 
flood” (Z III: “The Wanderer”). For Nietzsche, loneliness signifies a painful 
psychological state caused by feeling alone.
Now the big question: Why does the demon offer the eternal recur-
rence to us when we are in our loneliest loneliness? The answer, I think, 
is not pretty: Nietzsche first wants us to fail the test—to recoil and “curse 
the demon” (GS 341). It should be obvious that facing the thought that our 
lives will recur “again and again” (GS 341) from a state of severe loneliness 
significantly amplifies the likelihood of eliciting a negative response. We are 
not presented the eternal recurrence in just any state of loneliness. If that 
were the case, we could imagine some individuals not being gripped by the 
demon’s suggestion. Some might enjoy moments of loneliness, for instance, 
and thus the aversive effect of loneliness might be minimal. Instead, we are 
presented with the eternal recurrence in a very particular moment of our 
lives: our loneliest loneliness.
Loneliness is nearly always painful. And our loneliest loneliness 
must certainly be painful. Not only this, but profound loneliness is often 
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associated with feelings of alienation, emptiness, unimportance, and 
 worthlessness—perhaps even shame, guilt, and regret.11 The demon sug-
gests that we imagine bearing the worst pain of feeling alone not just once, 
but “innumerable times again” (GS 341). Entertaining this thought, it seems 
to me, explains why Nietzsche calls the eternal recurrence the “heaviest 
weight” (GS 341). No one wants to imagine feeling his or her deepest, dark-
est loneliness again and again indefinitely. Genuinely embracing such a 
thought is simply crushing.
The fact that Nietzsche appears to want us to fail the test is supported 
by his understanding of our affective engagement with the world. R. Lanier 
Anderson helpfully explains that for Nietzsche affects involve a “stimu-
lus object,” or an object that activates an affect, and a “default behavioral 
response,” or a typical behavior caused by a particular affect.12 Our hearing 
the demon deliver the thought of eternal recurrence is a striking stimulus 
object. What affective orientation does it activate? Given that we consider 
the test from a superlative state of loneliness, the test aims to produce the 
highest possible degree of the pain of feeling alone. This feeling would be 
immensely hard. And reviewing the entirety of our lives from such a state 
would likely highlight other times we were wrought with intensely nega-
tive feelings of isolation. Being in any maximally affective state should ren-
der us sensitive to similar states. If I were to imagine reliving my life again 
and again from a state of being enveloped in some extremely triumphant 
achievement, for instance, my attention would likely be drawn to similar 
feelings of success. Thinking about reliving our most extreme loneliness 
over and over again should therefore draw our attention to reliving other 
forms of painful isolation. Nietzsche asks, “Would you not throw your-
self down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?” 
(GS 341). Absolutely. Rejecting the test certainly appears to be the behav-
ioral response Nietzsche expects us to have. But, I suggest, only initially.
The experiment is introduced in our loneliest loneliness because imag-
ining our lives eternally recurring from that perspective should move 
us to overcome our loneliness after first cursing the demon. The painful 
thought of unending loneliness should push us to face the challenge of self- 
transformation. This is the behavioral response Nietzsche wants to provoke. 
He wants us to understand our psychological distress so that we transform 
ourselves. “Lonely one [Einsamer],” he says, “you are going the way to your-
self,” but, “You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could 
you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes!” (Z I: “On the 
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Way of the Creator”). Zarathustra proclaims that his “ultimate loneliness” 
involves going “down deeper than ever I descended—deeper into pain than 
I ever descended,” and “It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must 
come to its height” (Z III: “The Wanderer”).13 Extreme loneliness enables 
us to embrace the eternal recurrence in the right spirit and work toward 
self-development.
One might worry that feeling deeply lonely is actually debilitating. 
Indeed, psychological studies have suggested that over time loneliness pre-
dicts increases of depressive symptomatology,14 and people who believe 
they face a future of social isolation tend to care about themselves less and 
less.15 But it has also been shown that loneliness signals to us that certain 
connections we strongly desire to forge require maintenance,16 and the 
drive to repair broken connections oftentimes outweighs debilitating inac-
tion.17 Much could depend on our attitude toward being lonely, but loneli-
ness appears to be a typically aversive psychological state that stimulates us 
to take action, specifically action that safeguards against feeling lonely. In 
this sense, loneliness can be a strong motivator.
Of course, many aversive psychological states, such as terror or hope-
lessness, can be motivating. However, I suggest that loneliness not only 
motivates self-transformation, but also puts us into a frame of mind to suc-
ceed at the task. The same cannot be said about other aversive psycholog-
ical states, like terror or hopelessness. In fact, such states are often far too 
incapacitating to generate self-development, let alone enable success. The 
right kind of motivation is a first, crucial step, but motivation could come 
to nothing without a chance to succeed.
How do we develop a positive behavioral response to the eternal 
recurrence from a state of profound loneliness? If we take the test seri-
ously as Nietzsche presents it, the test will not allow positive responses 
that concern sheer fantasy and otherworldly religion. Flights into fan-
tasy, such as daydreams, involve voluntary creations of the imagination 
aimed at providing pleasure, which can help many avoid the pain of lone-
liness. But, according to Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence pertains to 
“this life as you now live it and have lived it” (GS 341), not some life we 
do not live but would like to live. The test also blocks escape by way of 
religion. Religions such as Christianity can provide the promise of last-
ing happiness and offer eternal companionship.18 But the eternal recur-
rence nullifies such consolation, since by hypothesis the test requires that 
we affirm or reject life only by assessing this world, where there is no 
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lasting fulfillment and where we experience extreme distress. We need a 
response to loneliness that addresses these problems.19
I suggest that if we focus exclusively on being better disposed toward 
ourselves and this world, as Nietzsche says, then loneliness can provide 
conditions for what he would consider a successful response to the eter-
nal recurrence. I want to point out three such conditions. These condi-
tions are not meant to secure any necessary causal links between loneliness 
and self-transformation. For Nietzsche, nothing guarantees successful 
 self- development. My argument is simply that loneliness presents a unique 
opportunity for such success. This should help explain the psychological 
setting of the eternal recurrence in GS 341.
The first condition that loneliness supplies for what Nietzsche would 
consider a successful response to the eternal recurrence is a feeling of being 
disconnected from one’s social environment, including intimate attach-
ments, friends, family, and collective group identities. Feeling socially dis-
connected, according to Nietzsche, enables us to gain a unique perspective 
on social values. It allows us to take a critical stance on standardly recognized 
values, perhaps even question the value of those values. The causality will 
sometimes go in the other direction, such that being critical of social values 
leads to loneliness. And perhaps one’s loneliest loneliness follows from crit-
ically engaging such values. Whatever the cause of loneliness, the point is 
that feeling personally isolated can indicate that one’s values are incompat-
ible with values commonly upheld and regulated by social relations. Social 
engagements often require acting in accordance with, or even supporting, 
values not fully our own, such that we feel out of place in regard to such val-
ues. Moreover, values that contribute to maintaining a harmonious social 
life are typically perceived to enjoy greater value than values endorsed by 
individuals regardless of social acceptance or utility. Loneliness can reveal 
the tension between values that we might authentically endorse and values 
that we might otherwise critically question or even reject. Loneliness can 
therefore provide significant insight into the values that we might want to 
embrace in order to become who we most desire to be.20
Feeling disconnected from the values that predominantly govern social 
life is fundamental for Nietzschean self-transformation. Importantly, such 
values are often closely associated with traditional moral systems. Nietzsche 
notes, “To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from moral-
ity” (KSA 11:26[283], p. 224).21 Freedom from morality, at the very least, 
requires breaking from unreflective commitment to dominant structures of 
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valuation. Nietzsche often points out that this break is  typically motivated 
by a new understanding of existing value systems, specifically the revelation 
that traditional moral codes promote values that benefit the social order 
by downplaying individuality. “Morality,” he remarks, “is herd-instinct in 
the individual” (GS 116). Feelings of loneliness, which can highlight the 
estrangement between one’s own values and those that govern social life, 
can help make possible this recognition. Some individuals will find this rec-
ognition difficult to bear, of course, but finding the strength to embrace this 
disconnect has great positive potential. Loneliness can show us that we are 
in some important sense free from the grip of value systems that are disad-
vantageous to individual development.
The second feature of loneliness that can contribute to passing the eter-
nal recurrence test is that lonely individuals actively distrust their social 
environment. Psychological studies have indicated that loneliness strongly 
increases attention to, and motivation to avoid, what are perceived to be the 
negative features of social life.22 Loneliness activates a heightened sensitiv-
ity to social dangers, which results from feeling uncertain about confiding 
in, depending on, or trusting others. On Nietzsche’s account, immersion 
into social life can be dangerous in the sense that social entanglements 
often result in the kinds of dependencies and blind trusts that limit our 
capacity and ability to develop and express unique values. We therefore 
need to protect our self-development from being undermined by our social 
existence. Loneliness contributes to developing the psychological disposi-
tion that enables such protection.
This feature of loneliness plays an important role in the “lion” stage of 
Nietzsche’s view of self-transformation, which is described in Zarathustra’s 
“On the Three Metamorphoses.”23 In the “loneliest [einsamsten] desert,” 
Nietzsche says, the lion emerges to “conquer his freedom” and “be master 
in his own desert.” Freedom and mastery require rejecting the dragon’s 
“Thou Shalt” and affirming “I will.” The dragon clearly represents tradi-
tional morality. According to Nietzsche, the lion “renounces” trust in, and 
dependence on, traditional moral values, which results in the “creation 
of freedom for oneself for new creation.” In the loneliest desert, then, the 
lion creates better opportunities to gain authentic values, and this pro-
cess relies on increased attention to features of social life that would dam-
age self-development.24 Accordingly, Nietzsche notices that those who 
support traditional moral systems, especially those who consider them-
selves “good” and “just” from the perspective of traditional morality, find 
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loneliness threatening. He writes, “[The good and the just] like to crucify 
those who invent their own virtue for themselves—they hate the lonely 
one” (Z I: “On the Way of the Creator”). Loneliness can arouse insight into 
how social life leads to the decline of individual good, which threatens 
social harmony.25
The third condition associated with loneliness that helps individuals 
affirm the eternal recurrence is that loneliness motivates self- interestedness. 
Although it seems that loneliness would induce us immediately to seek 
out company, rather than first caring for ourselves, research suggests the 
reverse.26 And, given the two conditions described above, this makes sense. 
We turn inward and attend to our own interests because loneliness not only 
involves feelings of separation, but also mistrust. When we feel our trust in 
social ties eroding, we tend to attempt repair from the inside out.
Importantly, Nietzsche thinks self-interestedness grounds self-trans-
formation. His criticism of compassion (Mitleid) in GS makes the point 
clear. He asks, “Is it good for you to be above all else compassionate per-
sons?” (GS 338). The answer is “no.” The demands of reducing suffering dis-
rupt self-development—“losing myself from my path” (GS 338). “Our own 
way,” Nietzsche says, “is so hard and demanding and so far from love and 
 gratitude of others that we are by no means reluctant to escape from it, from 
it and our ownmost conscience—and take refuge in the conscience of oth-
ers” (GS 338). Loneliness can leave us feeling detached from the “love and 
gratitude of others,” but rather than overcome loneliness by seeking care by 
others, or taking “refuge in the conscience of others,” we must first care for 
ourselves. It might be hard to reject such refuge, but accepting the feeling 
that others have failed us can strengthen our resolve to focus on expressing 
our “ownmost conscience.” Loneliness moves us to attend to ourselves, at 
least first and foremost, which is imperative for self-development.
Let me summarize the account so far. I have argued that imagin-
ing the eternal recurrence in a state of our loneliest loneliness provokes 
 self- transformation because feeling disconnected from social life and 
distrustful toward common social connections moves us to seek out and 
embrace values that are truly our own. Nietzsche initiates the test when we 
are in an extreme state of isolation because he understands that our feel-
ings of separation can inspire authenticity. But passing the test is clearly not 
easy. Nietzschean self-transformation is incredibly difficult. However, by 
having a proper understanding of the psychological setting of the test, we 
can begin to understand what enables us to overcome the hurdles we face.
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Before moving on, I want to be clear that none of what I have said entails 
that, on Nietzsche’s account, loneliness reveals that we are nonsocial, or 
that Nietzschean self-development is a nonsocial project. Loneliness is not 
some ontological state of existing alone—it is the feeling of being alone, a 
feeling that transforms our understanding of social life. Our social exis-
tence is not something that can be rejected altogether. Nietzsche writes, 
for example, “These people who have fled inward for their freedom also 
have to live outwardly, become visible, let themselves be seen; they are 
united with mankind through countless ties of blood, residence, education, 
fatherland, chance, [and] the importunity of others” (SE 3, p. 139). Rejecting 
traditional values does not imply rejecting social values across the board, 
and endorsing authentic values does not imply endorsing nonsocial values. 
Nietzschean self-development does emphasize the individual, but there is 
no freeing the individual from social existence. Self-transformation helps 
us forge a better understanding of ourselves, which includes a better under-
standing of how we most want to connect to others, or how we might be 
authentic while maintaining our social connections.27
Now consider some objections. First, one might argue that it is inappro-
priate to appeal to the psychological studies that I have mentioned. Those 
studies draw general conclusions about ordinary individuals, whereas 
Nietzsche seems concerned only with higher individuals. It seems that the 
studies are irrelevant to Nietzsche’s aims, and thus do no important work 
here.
My response is twofold. First, while Nietzsche certainly does focus on 
the importance of higher individuals, he also thinks everyone can and 
should attempt self-transformation. In an aphorism titled “Traffic with 
one’s higher self,” for instance, he says, “Everyone has his good days when 
he discovers his higher self; and true humanity demands that everyone be 
evaluated only in the light of this condition” (HH 624). Everyone has some 
relation to his or her higher self, and genuine humanity should be judged in 
terms of discovering that self. In another passage, he writes, “There is clearly 
no trick that enables us to turn a poor virtue into a rich and overflowing 
one, but we can surely reinterpret its poverty into a necessity, so that its 
sight no longer offends us and we no longer make reproachful faces at fate 
on its account” (GS 17). I see no reason to think that Nietzsche intends to 
limit the scope of this advice only to a select few. Indeed, from UM to EH, 
Nietzsche consistently provides advice for how ordinary folk might trans-
form themselves. Of course, such passages are usually not very provocative, 
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and maybe that is why they are overlooked. But they are—undeniably—
everywhere.28 Nietzsche’s famous proclamation “You should become who 
you are” (GS  270) is perfectly general. “The Three Metamorphoses” per-
tains to all agents. And anyone can feel “the heaviest weight,” the eternal 
recurrence.
But—and this is second part of my response—not everyone can suc-
ceed in self-transformation, and Nietzsche thinks higher individuals have 
a better chance at success. He famously proclaims, “To ‘give style’ to one’s 
character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the 
strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them 
into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weak-
nesses delight the eye” (GS 290). Notice the universal scope: we can all give 
“style” to our characters. But the project requires “long practice and daily 
work,” and Nietzsche reports that “it will be the strong and domineering 
natures who experience their most exquisite pleasure under such coercion,” 
whereas “it is the weak characters with no power over themselves who 
hate the constraint of style” (GS 290). Weak-natured individuals certainly 
have a chance at successful self-transformation, but Nietzsche’s descrip-
tion of the profound difference in affective responses between weak- and 
 strong- natured individuals suggests that the latter have a better success rate. 
It is then likely that those who are able to affirm the eternal recurrence are 
those strong enough to overcome their loneliest loneliness, while weaker 
individuals have greater chances of failure. But we all have a shot, and the 
psychological studies I have cited help us understand how and why we 
might be motivated to succeed, which is clearly what Nietzsche wants.
A related worry is that it seems natural to say that our aversive 
feelings toward loneliness would move us to abandon the project of 
 self- transformation, since such a project can itself cause terrible loneliness. 
Generating values that are uniquely our own could cause distressful isola-
tion. Returning to “the herd” can ease that distress. Thus, loneliness seems 
to have the opposite effect of what I have presented here.
There is no doubt that some individuals could be motivated to avoid 
loneliness by rejecting self-transformation and running back to others. 
But this does not make the best sense of what we know empirically about 
loneliness, especially combined with the affective state of embracing the 
eternal recurrence test as Nietzsche imagines it. We are asked to review 
our lives from a maximal degree of loneliness. Even nonmaximally, though, 
loneliness reveals a separation from others, a distrust of others, and an 
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incentive to look inward. The maximal state of loneliness, then, especially 
if one  imagines that state repeating indefinitely, should undermine the 
motivation to embrace “the herd.” Moreover, while aversive feelings toward 
loneliness might very well manifest themselves during the self-transforma-
tion process, undergoing that process should also manifest certain plea-
sures, in particular pleasures felt when we succeed at grasping values that 
express who we most desire to be. These pleasures have clear forward-mov-
ing motivational force. For this reason, those who find self-development 
pleasurable, such as higher individuals, have a strong chance of beating 
out aversive feelings after cursing the demon and embarking on the path 
toward self- development. Overall, then, the motivation to overcome our 
loneliest loneliness by transforming ourselves should effectively outweigh 
aversive feelings that arise during transformation.
One might also be worried that the psychological context of the eternal 
recurrence cuts us off not only from the herd, but also from friends who 
might empower self-development. Nietzsche’s view of friendship, however, 
is not our ordinary conception. He writes, “Our faith in others betrays in 
what respect we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a 
friend is our betrayer” (Z I: “On the Friend”). Seeking friendship often 
counters self-reliance. But there are important exceptions. For Nietzsche, 
genuine friendship should advance mutual self-transformation. Such a 
project involves letting friends suffer so that they might become their best 
selves. He writes, “If one wants to have a friend one must also want to wage 
war for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy. [. . .] 
Can you go close to your friend without going over to him?” (Z I: “On the 
Friend”). To “go over” to a friend is to provide blanket comfort in such a way 
that betrays the friend’s ability to develop as an individual. Alternatively, 
being an “enemy” while being “close” involves choosing to deny comforts 
to friends at particular moments, with the aim of helping them undergo 
self-development. “Compassion for the friend,” Nietzsche remarks, “should 
conceal itself under a hard shell” (Z I: “On the Friend”). Imagining the eter-
nal recurrence is perhaps the most important moment for friends to with-
draw explicit comfort, assuming the test does not already undermine the 
grounds of that relationship. Close friends should allow us to grapple with 
the terrifying thoughts of recurrence. Nietzsche therefore seems to think 
that the transformative power of the eternal recurrence is actually enhanced 
when someone is separated from close friends—and it may even be our 
friend’s duty to ensure separation during such critical moments.
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Let us return to the issue about the desire to avoid loneliness. There is a 
common problem that bedevils our understanding the eternal recurrence 
as a practical thought experiment, which my reading solves. The problem is 
that Nietzsche’s infamous “last man” might pass the test. The “last man” is 
someone who is perfectly self-satisfied—someone who is happy, comfort-
able, and lazy and sees no need to strive to achieve difficult goals, especially 
self-transformation. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s “last man” is often con-
sidered the harbinger of nihilism. Unfortunately, it is easy to see the “last 
man” dismissing Nietzsche’s demon with a complacent shrug and saying, 
“Sure, I would do this again forever. Why not?” It would be devastating for 
Nietzsche’s account if the “last man” could easily and genuinely affirm the 
eternal recurrence. But launching the test from a state of profound loneli-
ness prevents such a response. The “last man” would not want to entertain 
reliving painful isolation again and again indefinitely. The available reac-
tions to such a thought can only be rejection that leads to failure or failure 
that invites change. Either way, smug self-satisfaction is unavailable. This 
crucial result requires paying close attention to the psychological context 
of the test.
Now consider other readings of the psychological setting of GS 341. 
Many commentators fail to notice the somber context altogether. But not 
all. Maudemarie Clark acknowledges the importance of the phrase “lone-
liest loneliness.” On her account, our loneliest loneliness “suggests a situa-
tion of vulnerability to suggestions one would otherwise dismiss,” and she 
identifies such vulnerability with “a situation in which critical powers are at 
a minimum.”29 Clark is right about loneliness being a state of vulnerability, 
and it does seem that loneliness can reduce our critical powers in the sense 
that being vulnerable can block skepticism that might disarm the demon’s 
thought and prevent it from being taken seriously. But loneliness does not 
minimize our critical awareness across the board. Empirical studies suggest 
that certain critical powers, specifically those that reveal various dangers 
involved with social life, are actually increased when one feels extremely 
lonely. Clark overlooks this positive feature of vulnerability—a feature that 
is vital for successfully achieving Nietzschean self-transformation.
Paul Loeb has offered the most extensive recent commentary on the 
eternal recurrence, so I would like to say something about his reading. 
Loeb views the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical view about the way the 
world is, rather than a practical thought experiment, and his interpretive 
goal is to explain how Nietzsche thinks we are able to discover the truth 
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of eternal recurrence in order to motivate us to change our lives. Loeb is 
not trying to explain why Nietzsche thinks a thought experiment about the 
eternal recurrence can motivate self-development. Nonetheless, Loeb gives 
three different readings of “einsamste Einsamkeit,” and even commenta-
tors who reject the metaphysical interpretation of the eternal recurrence 
could be tempted to embrace those readings. Though none of what follows 
directly challenges Loeb’s work, I want to show, for those of us who pre-
fer the thought-experiment reading, why none of Loeb’s readings can both 
motivate and help us succeed at self-development.
I have already mentioned Loeb’s first interpretation. He argues that “eins-
amste Einsamkeit” should be translated as “most solitary solitude,” primarily 
because “solitude” captures what Nietzsche “commends as the best possible 
state for maximizing one’s critical powers.”30 I suggested that translating 
“Einsamkeit” as “solitude” in GS 341 leads to a significant difficulty: it fails to 
explain why self-development is motivated. For Nietzsche, self-transforma-
tion is motivated because we are terrified of what it would feel like to embrace 
the eternal recurrence from an extreme state of painful isolation—what it 
would feel like to endure lasting, profound loneliness, gritting one’s teeth 
through feelings like alienation, unimportance, and the like, with no end in 
sight. Feeling confident in our critical abilities cannot be said to be nearly so 
motivating. Loeb writes that for Nietzsche solitude involves “isolating one-
self from the common opinion in order to discover and bring to the sur-
face one’s own deepest instinctive wisdom.”31 But such isolation puts the cart 
before the horse. It does not explain how feelings of isolation manifest the 
need for self-transformation in the first place. Loeb correctly characterizes 
Nietzschean solitude as an intentional state, but loneliness is typically a state 
into which we find ourselves helplessly thrown and needing to escape.32
Loeb’s second reading of “einsamste Einsamkeit” falls short for similar 
reasons. “The most solitary solitude,” Loeb says, “alludes to the poetic idea 
that everyone dies alone.”33 But linking “Einsamkeit” to the idea that everyone 
dies alone requires translating “Einsamkeit” as “loneliness” rather than “soli-
tude.” The majority of us—though certainly not all—are scared of dying alone, 
not of being critically aware. And, given the right frame of mind, our fear of 
death can move us to achieve the best version of ourselves before we are gone. 
Again, the motivation to affirm the eternal recurrence relies on loneliness.
Loeb’s final reading occurs in his most recent work. He claims that “the 
most solitary of solitudes in which I hear my demon’s revelation alludes 
to Nietzsche’s view that my conscious mind is the evolved psychological 
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location for social communication.”34 In intense solitude, Loeb suggests, we 
can hear our authentic voice speak to us, though the voice is unconscious. 
This interpretation pulls together disparate texts (namely, TI “Socrates” 
4; BGE 6; GS 354) that connect the eternal recurrence to outside themes 
like representational consciousness and evolutionary psychology. As I see 
things, however, the message of GS 341 is clear in that very passage: Nietzsche 
believes that coming to grips with the demon’s suggestion in a state of pro-
found loneliness will be transformative. Loeb’s account also implies that 
when we hear the demon we cannot consciously understand the need to 
undergo self-development. But GS 341 says nothing to this effect. In fact, the 
passage suggests the opposite. The task of becoming “well disposed” to our-
selves and to life, such that we “long for nothing more fervently” than eternal 
recurrence, certainly appears to be a conscious affirmation. Nietzsche does 
think unconscious motives play a significant role in steering our lives, but 
an adequate response to the eternal recurrence is a reflective choice.35
With objections and alternative readings dispatched, let me conclude. 
I have attempted to explain the importance of the psychological context 
of GS 341 if we take the eternal recurrence to be a practical thought exper-
iment meant to transform our lives. Hearing the demon in our loneliest 
loneliness not only encourages Nietzschean self-transformation, but also 
helps us succeed in this project, and empirical research can be marshalled 
to support this conclusion. The specific psychological context of GS 341 is 
therefore essential for understanding why and how the eternal recurrence 
is supposed to enable self-development.
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